commonly only a stronger form of

διᾰπορ-έω,

A to be quite at a loss, to be in doubt or difficulty,

τί χρὴ δρᾶν Pl.Lg. 777c

;

ἐπὶ τοῖς συμβαίνουσι Plb.4.71.5

: in [tense] aor. [voice] Pass.,

διηπορήθη Aeschin.2.34

: [tense] pf. [voice] Pass.,

διηπορημένος Plu.Alex.25

:—[voice] Med.,

δ. ὑπ' αἰσχύνης Pl.Phdr. 237a

.

2 to be in want, Arist.Oec. 1353a26.

II go through all the ἀπορίαι, Id.Pol. 1276b36, al.: but,

2 commonly only a stronger form of ἀπορέω, raise an ἀπορία, start a difficulty, Id.EN 1096a11;

ἔστι δὲ τοῖς εὐπορῆσαι βουλομένοις προὔργου τὸ διαπορῆσαι καλῶς Id.Metaph. 995a28

;

πὲρί τινος Plb.4.20.2

, Phld. Sign.21;

εἰ.. Epicur.Fr.21

:—[voice] Med.,

διαπορεῖσθαί τι περί τινος Pl. Sph. 217a

:—[voice] Pass., to be matter of doubt or discussion, Pl.Sph. 250e, Arist.Metaph. 1086a19, al.;

τὸ διαπορούμενον Pl.Lg. 799e

;

τὸ διαπορεῖσθαι Arist.EN 1101a35

;

τὸ διαπορηθέν Id.Pol. 1282b8

: impers., διαπορεῖται περί τινος a question arises about.., Id.HA 631b2.

   1) Programs and the Complexity of Human Mental Processes

   In my opinion, none of [these programs] does even remote justice to the complexity of human mental processes. Unlike men, "artificially intelligent" programs tend to be single minded, undistractable, and unemotional. (Neisser, 1967, p. 9)

   2) Artificial Intelligence Is an Engineering Discipline

   Future progress in [artificial intelligence] will depend on the development of both practical and theoretical knowledge.... As regards theoretical knowledge, some have sought a unified theory of artificial intelligence. My view is that artificial intelligence is (or soon will be) an engineering discipline since its primary goal is to build things. (Nilsson, 1971, pp. vii-viii)

   3) A Sceptical View of Artificial Intelligence

   Most workers in AI [artificial intelligence] research and in related fields confess to a pronounced feeling of disappointment in what has been achieved in the last 25 years. Workers entered the field around 1950, and even around 1960, with high hopes that are very far from being realized in 1972. In no part of the field have the discoveries made so far produced the major impact that was then promised.... In the meantime, claims and predictions regarding the potential results of AI research had been publicized which went even farther than the expectations of the majority of workers in the field, whose embarrassments have been added to by the lamentable failure of such inflated predictions....

   When able and respected scientists write in letters to the present author that AI, the major goal of computing science, represents "another step in the general process of evolution"; that possibilities in the 1980s include an all-purpose intelligence on a human-scale knowledge base; that awe-inspiring possibilities suggest themselves based on machine intelligence exceeding human intelligence by the year 2000 [one has the right to be skeptical]. (Lighthill, 1972, p. 17)

   4) Just as Astronomy Succeeded Astrology, the Discovery of Intellectual Processes in Machines Should Lead to a Science, Eventually

   Just as astronomy succeeded astrology, following Kepler's discovery of planetary regularities, the discoveries of these many principles in empirical explorations on intellectual processes in machines should lead to a science, eventually. (Minsky & Papert, 1973, p. 11)

   5) Problems in Machine Intelligence Arise Because Things Obvious to Any Person Are Not Represented in the Program

   Many problems arise in experiments on machine intelligence because things obvious to any person are not represented in any program. One can pull with a string, but one cannot push with one.... Simple facts like these caused serious problems when Charniak attempted to extend Bobrow's "Student" program to more realistic applications, and they have not been faced up to until now. (Minsky & Papert, 1973, p. 77)

   6) The Meaning of a Symbolic Description

   What do we mean by [a symbolic] "description"? We do not mean to suggest that our descriptions must be made of strings of ordinary language words (although they might be). The simplest kind of description is a structure in which some features of a situation are represented by single ("primitive") symbols, and relations between those features are represented by other symbols-or by other features of the way the description is put together. (Minsky & Papert, 1973, p. 11)

   7) The Principle of Artificial Intelligence

   [AI is] the use of computer programs and programming techniques to cast light on the principles of intelligence in general and human thought in particular. (Boden, 1977, p. 5)

   8) Artificial Intelligence Recognizes the Need for Knowledge in Its Systems

   The word you look for and hardly ever see in the early AI literature is the word knowledge. They didn't believe you have to know anything, you could always rework it all.... In fact 1967 is the turning point in my mind when there was enough feeling that the old ideas of general principles had to go.... I came up with an argument for what I called the primacy of expertise, and at the time I called the other guys the generalists. (Moses, quoted in McCorduck, 1979, pp. 228-229)

   9) Artificial Intelligence Is Psychology in a Particularly Pure and Abstract Form

   The basic idea of cognitive science is that intelligent beings are semantic engines-in other words, automatic formal systems with interpretations under which they consistently make sense. We can now see why this includes psychology and artificial intelligence on a more or less equal footing: people and intelligent computers (if and when there are any) turn out to be merely different manifestations of the same underlying phenomenon. Moreover, with universal hardware, any semantic engine can in principle be formally imitated by a computer if only the right program can be found. And that will guarantee semantic imitation as well, since (given the appropriate formal behavior) the semantics is "taking care of itself" anyway. Thus we also see why, from this perspective, artificial intelligence can be regarded as psychology in a particularly pure and abstract form. The same fundamental structures are under investigation, but in AI, all the relevant parameters are under direct experimental control (in the programming), without any messy physiology or ethics to get in the way. (Haugeland, 1981b, p. 31)

    10) There Are Many Types of Reasoning

   There are many different kinds of reasoning one might imagine:

    Formal reasoning involves the syntactic manipulation of data structures to deduce new ones following prespecified rules of inference. Mathematical logic is the archetypical formal representation. Procedural reasoning uses simulation to answer questions and solve problems. When we use a program to answer What is the sum of 3 and 4? it uses, or "runs," a procedural model of arithmetic. Reasoning by analogy seems to be a very natural mode of thought for humans but, so far, difficult to accomplish in AI programs. The idea is that when you ask the question Can robins fly? the system might reason that "robins are like sparrows, and I know that sparrows can fly, so robins probably can fly."

    Generalization and abstraction are also natural reasoning process for humans that are difficult to pin down well enough to implement in a program. If one knows that Robins have wings, that Sparrows have wings, and that Blue jays have wings, eventually one will believe that All birds have wings. This capability may be at the core of most human learning, but it has not yet become a useful technique in AI.... Meta- level reasoning is demonstrated by the way one answers the question What is Paul Newman's telephone number? You might reason that "if I knew Paul Newman's number, I would know that I knew it, because it is a notable fact." This involves using "knowledge about what you know," in particular, about the extent of your knowledge and about the importance of certain facts. Recent research in psychology and AI indicates that meta-level reasoning may play a central role in human cognitive processing. (Barr & Feigenbaum, 1981, pp. 146-147)

    11) Programs Are Beginning to Do Things That Critics Have Asserted to Be Impossible

   Suffice it to say that programs already exist that can do things-or, at the very least, appear to be beginning to do things-which ill-informed critics have asserted a priori to be impossible. Examples include: perceiving in a holistic as opposed to an atomistic way; using language creatively; translating sensibly from one language to another by way of a language-neutral semantic representation; planning acts in a broad and sketchy fashion, the details being decided only in execution; distinguishing between different species of emotional reaction according to the psychological context of the subject. (Boden, 1981, p. 33)

    12) The Synthesis of Man and Machine

   Can the synthesis of Man and Machine ever be stable, or will the purely organic component become such a hindrance that it has to be discarded? If this eventually happens-and I have... good reasons for thinking that it must-we have nothing to regret and certainly nothing to fear. (Clarke, 1984, p. 243)

    13) The Thesis of Good Old-Fashioned Artificial Intelligence (GOFAI)

   The thesis of GOFAI... is not that the processes underlying intelligence can be described symbolically... but that they are symbolic. (Haugeland, 1985, p. 113)

    14) Artificial Intelligence Provides a Useful Approach to Psychological and Psychiatric Theory Formation

   It is all very well formulating psychological and psychiatric theories verbally but, when using natural language (even technical jargon), it is difficult to recognise when a theory is complete; oversights are all too easily made, gaps too readily left. This is a point which is generally recognised to be true and it is for precisely this reason that the behavioural sciences attempt to follow the natural sciences in using "classical" mathematics as a more rigorous descriptive language. However, it is an unfortunate fact that, with a few notable exceptions, there has been a marked lack of success in this application. It is my belief that a different approach-a different mathematics-is needed, and that AI provides just this approach. (Hand, quoted in Hand, 1985, pp. 6-7)

    15) Four Kinds of Artificial Intelligence

   We might distinguish among four kinds of AI.

   ♦ Nonpsychological AI

   Research of this kind involves building and programming computers to perform tasks which, to paraphrase Marvin Minsky, would require intelligence if they were done by us. Researchers in nonpsychological AI make no claims whatsoever about the psychological realism of their programs or the devices they build, that is, about whether or not computers perform tasks as humans do.

   ♦ Weak Psychological AI

   Research here is guided by the view that the computer is a useful tool in the study of mind. In particular, we can write computer programs or build devices that simulate alleged psychological processes in humans and then test our predictions about how the alleged processes work. We can weave these programs and devices together with other programs and devices that simulate different alleged mental processes and thereby test the degree to which the AI system as a whole simulates human mentality. According to weak psychological AI, working with computer models is a way of refining and testing hypotheses about processes that are allegedly realized in human minds.

   ♦ Strong Psychological AI

... According to this view, our minds are computers and therefore can be duplicated by other computers. Sherry Turkle writes that the "real ambition is of mythic proportions, making a general purpose intelligence, a mind." (Turkle, 1984, p. 240) The authors of a major text announce that "the ultimate goal of AI research is to build a person or, more humbly, an animal." (Charniak & McDermott, 1985, p. 7)

   ♦ Suprapsychological AI

   Research in this field, like strong psychological AI, takes seriously the functionalist view that mentality can be realized in many different types of physical devices. Suprapsychological AI, however, accuses strong psychological AI of being chauvinisticof being only interested in human intelligence! Suprapsychological AI claims to be interested in all the conceivable ways intelligence can be realized. (Flanagan, 1991, pp. 241-242)

    16) Determination of Relevance of Rules in Particular Contexts

   Even if the [rules] were stored in a context-free form the computer still couldn't use them. To do that the computer requires rules enabling it to draw on just those [ rules] which are relevant in each particular context. Determination of relevance will have to be based on further facts and rules, but the question will again arise as to which facts and rules are relevant for making each particular determination. One could always invoke further facts and rules to answer this question, but of course these must be only the relevant ones. And so it goes. It seems that AI workers will never be able to get started here unless they can settle the problem of relevance beforehand by cataloguing types of context and listing just those facts which are relevant in each. (Dreyfus & Dreyfus, 1986, p. 80)

    17) Form and Content Are Not Fundamentally Different

   Perhaps the single most important idea to artificial intelligence is that there is no fundamental difference between form and content, that meaning can be captured in a set of symbols such as a semantic net. (G. Johnson, 1986, p. 250)

    18) The Assumption That the Mind Is a Formal System

   Artificial intelligence is based on the assumption that the mind can be described as some kind of formal system manipulating symbols that stand for things in the world. Thus it doesn't matter what the brain is made of, or what it uses for tokens in the great game of thinking. Using an equivalent set of tokens and rules, we can do thinking with a digital computer, just as we can play chess using cups, salt and pepper shakers, knives, forks, and spoons. Using the right software, one system (the mind) can be mapped into the other (the computer). (G. Johnson, 1986, p. 250)

    19) A Statement of the Primary and Secondary Purposes of Artificial Intelligence

   The primary goal of Artificial Intelligence is to make machines smarter.

   The secondary goals of Artificial Intelligence are to understand what intelligence is (the Nobel laureate purpose) and to make machines more useful (the entrepreneurial purpose). (Winston, 1987, p. 1)

    20) Mathematical Logic Provides the Basis for Theory in AI

   The theoretical ideas of older branches of engineering are captured in the language of mathematics. We contend that mathematical logic provides the basis for theory in AI. Although many computer scientists already count logic as fundamental to computer science in general, we put forward an even stronger form of the logic-is-important argument....

   AI deals mainly with the problem of representing and using declarative (as opposed to procedural) knowledge. Declarative knowledge is the kind that is expressed as sentences, and AI needs a language in which to state these sentences. Because the languages in which this knowledge usually is originally captured (natural languages such as English) are not suitable for computer representations, some other language with the appropriate properties must be used. It turns out, we think, that the appropriate properties include at least those that have been uppermost in the minds of logicians in their development of logical languages such as the predicate calculus. Thus, we think that any language for expressing knowledge in AI systems must be at least as expressive as the first-order predicate calculus. (Genesereth & Nilsson, 1987, p. viii)

    21) Perceptual Structures Can Be Represented as Lists of Elementary Propositions

   In artificial intelligence studies, perceptual structures are represented as assemblages of description lists, the elementary components of which are propositions asserting that certain relations hold among elements. (Chase & Simon, 1988, p. 490)

    22) Definitions of Artificial Intelligence

   Artificial intelligence (AI) is sometimes defined as the study of how to build and/or program computers to enable them to do the sorts of things that minds can do. Some of these things are commonly regarded as requiring intelligence: offering a medical diagnosis and/or prescription, giving legal or scientific advice, proving theorems in logic or mathematics. Others are not, because they can be done by all normal adults irrespective of educational background (and sometimes by non-human animals too), and typically involve no conscious control: seeing things in sunlight and shadows, finding a path through cluttered terrain, fitting pegs into holes, speaking one's own native tongue, and using one's common sense. Because it covers AI research dealing with both these classes of mental capacity, this definition is preferable to one describing AI as making computers do "things that would require intelligence if done by people." However, it presupposes that computers could do what minds can do, that they might really diagnose, advise, infer, and understand. One could avoid this problematic assumption (and also side-step questions about whether computers do things in the same way as we do) by defining AI instead as "the development of computers whose observable performance has features which in humans we would attribute to mental processes." This bland characterization would be acceptable to some AI workers, especially amongst those focusing on the production of technological tools for commercial purposes. But many others would favour a more controversial definition, seeing AI as the science of intelligence in general-or, more accurately, as the intellectual core of cognitive science. As such, its goal is to provide a systematic theory that can explain (and perhaps enable us to replicate) both the general categories of intentionality and the diverse psychological capacities grounded in them. (Boden, 1990b, pp. 1-2)

    23) The Computer Can Not Be a Model of the Mind

   Because the ability to store data somewhat corresponds to what we call memory in human beings, and because the ability to follow logical procedures somewhat corresponds to what we call reasoning in human beings, many members of the cult have concluded that what computers do somewhat corresponds to what we call thinking. It is no great difficulty to persuade the general public of that conclusion since computers process data very fast in small spaces well below the level of visibility; they do not look like other machines when they are at work. They seem to be running along as smoothly and silently as the brain does when it remembers and reasons and thinks. On the other hand, those who design and build computers know exactly how the machines are working down in the hidden depths of their semiconductors. Computers can be taken apart, scrutinized, and put back together. Their activities can be tracked, analyzed, measured, and thus clearly understood-which is far from possible with the brain. This gives rise to the tempting assumption on the part of the builders and designers that computers can tell us something about brains, indeed, that the computer can serve as a model of the mind, which then comes to be seen as some manner of information processing machine, and possibly not as good at the job as the machine. (Roszak, 1994, pp. xiv-xv)

    24) Computers Will Not Always Be Inferior to Human Brains

   The inner workings of the human mind are far more intricate than the most complicated systems of modern technology. Researchers in the field of artificial intelligence have been attempting to develop programs that will enable computers to display intelligent behavior. Although this field has been an active one for more than thirty-five years and has had many notable successes, AI researchers still do not know how to create a program that matches human intelligence. No existing program can recall facts, solve problems, reason, learn, and process language with human facility. This lack of success has occurred not because computers are inferior to human brains but rather because we do not yet know in sufficient detail how intelligence is organized in the brain. (Anderson, 1995, p. 2)

făcĭo, feci, factum, 3, v. a. and n.; in pass.: fio, factus, fieri ( imper. usually fac, but the arch form face is freq., esp. in Plaut. and Ter., as Plaut. As. prol. 4; 1, 1, 77; id. Aul. 2, 1, 30; id. Cist. 2, 1, 28; id. Ep. 1, 1, 37; 2, 2, 117; id. Most. 3, 2, 167 et saep.; Ter. And. 4, 1, 57; 4, 2, 29; 5, 1, 2; 14; id. Eun. 1, 2, 10 al.; Cato, R. R. 23, 1; 26; 32 al.; Cat. 63, 78; 79; 82; Ov. Med. fac. 60; Val. Fl. 7, 179 al.; futur. facie for faciam, Cato ap. Quint. 1, 7, 23; cf. dico, init., and the letter e:

faxo,

Plaut. Am. 1, 1, 199; 2, 1, 42; 3, 3, 17; 3, 4, 14; 5, 1, 55 et saep.; Ter. And. 5, 2, 13; id. Eun. 2, 2, 54; 4, 3, 21 al.; Verg. A. 9, 154; 12, 316; Ov. M. 3, 271; 12, 594: faxim, Enn. ap. Non. 507, 23; Plaut. Am. 1, 3, 13; id. Aul. 3, 2, 6; 3, 5, 20 al.; Ter. And. 4, 4, 14; id. Heaut. 1, 2, 13:

faxis,

Hor. S. 2, 3, 38; Sil. 15, 362: faxit, Lex Numae in Paul. ex Fest. s. v. ALIVTA, p. 6 Mull.; Fragm. XII. Tab. ap. Gell. 20, 1, 12; Plaut. Capt. 3, 4, 90; 3, 5, 54; id. Cas. 3, 5, 6 al.; Ter. Heaut. 1, 2, 24; id. Phorm. 3, 3, 21:

faximus,

Plaut. Truc. 1, 1, 40: faxitis, an old form in Liv. 23, 11, 2; 25, 12, 10; 29, 27, 3:

faxint,

Plaut. Am. 2, 1, 85; id. Aul. 2, 1, 27; 2, 2, 79 al.; Ter. Heaut. 1, 1, 109; id. Hec. 1, 2, 27; 3, 2, 19; Cic. Verr. 2, 3, 35, § 81; id. Fam. 14, 3, 3.—In pass. imper.:

fi,

Plaut. Curc. 1, 1, 87; Hor. S. 2, 5, 38; Pers. 1, 1, 39:

fite,

Plaut. Curc. 1, 1, 89 al. — Indic.: facitur, Nigid. ap. Non. 507, 15: fitur, Cato ap. Prisc. p. 789:

fiebantur,

id. ib.: fitum est, Liv. Andron. ap. Non. 475, 16.— Subj.: faciatur, Titin. ib.— Inf.: fiere, Enn. ap. Charis. p. 75 P.; Ann. v. 15, ed. Vahl.; Laev. ap. Gell. 19, 7, 10.—On the long i of fit, v. Ritschl, prol. p. 184, and cf. Plaut. Capt. prol. 25: ut fit in bello) [prob. root bha-; Sanscr. bhasas, light; Gr. pha-, in phainô, phêmi; cf. fax, facetiae, facilis, Corss. Ausspr. 1, 423.—But Curt. refers facio to root the- (strengthened THEK), Griech. Etym. p. 64], to make in all senses, to do, perform, accomplish, prepare, produce, bring to pass, cause, effect, create, commit, perpetrate, form, fashion, etc. (cf. in gen.:

ago, factito, reddo, operor, tracto): verbum facere omnem omnino faciendi causam complectitur, donandi, solvendi, judicandi, ambulandi, numerandi,

Dig. 50, 16, 218.

In gen.

With acc.: ut faber, cum quid aedificaturus est, non ipse facit materiam, sed ea utitur, quae sit parata, etc.... Quod si non est a deo materia facta, ne terra quidem et aqua et aer et ignis a deo factus est, Cic. N. D. Fragm. ap. Lact. 2, 8 (Cic. ed. Bait. 7, p. 121):

sphaera ab Archimede facta,

Cic. Rep. 1, 14:

fecitque idem et sepsit de manubiis comitium et curiam,

id. ib. 2, 17:

aedem,

id. ib. 2, 20:

pontem in Arari faciundum curat,

Caes. B. G. 1, 13, 1:

castra,

id. ib. 1, 48, 2; Cic. Fam. 15, 4, 4:

faber vasculum fecit,

Quint. 7, 10, 9:

classem,

Caes. B. G. 4, 21, 4:

cenas et facere et obire,

Cic. Att. 9, 13, 6:

ignem lignis viridibus,

id. Verr. 2, 1, 17, § 45:

poema,

to compose, id. Pis. 29, 70:

carmina,

Juv. 7, 28:

versus,

id. 7, 38:

sermonem,

Cic. Fam. 9, 8, 1; cf.

litteram,

id. Ac. 2, 2, 6: ludos, to celebrate, exhibit = edere, id. Rep. 2, 20; id. Att. 15, 10;

also i. q. ludificari,

Plaut. Capt. 3, 4, 47:

sementes,

i. e. to sow, Caes. B. G. 1, 3, 1:

messem,

Col. 2, 10, 28:

pecuniam,

to make, acquire, Cic. Verr. 2, 2, 6, § 17:

manum (with parare copias),

to collect, prepare, id. Caecin. 12, 33; so,

cohortes,

Caes. B. C. 3, 87, 4:

exercitum,

Vell. 2, 109, 2; and:

auxilia mercede,

Tac. A. 6, 33:

iter,

Cic. Att. 3, 1; id. Planc. 26, 65; id. Div. 1, 33, 73 et saep.; cf.

also the phrases: aditum sibi ad aures,

Quint. 4, 1, 46:

admirationem alicujus rei alicui,

to excite, Liv. 25, 11, 18; Sen. Ep. 115:

aes alienum,

Cic. Att. 13, 46, 4; Liv. 2, 23, 5; Sen. Ep. 119, 1:

alienationem disjunctionemque,

Cic. Lael. 21, 76:

animum alicui,

Liv. 25, 11, 10:

arbitrium de aliquo,

to decide, Hor. C. 4, 7, 21;

opp. arbitrium alicui in aliqua re,

i. e. to leave the decision to one, Liv. 43, 15, 5:

audaciam hosti,

id. 29, 34, 10:

audientiam orationi,

Cic. Div. in Caecil. 13, 42:

auspicium alicui,

Liv. 1, 34, 9; Hor. Ep. 1, 1, 86:

auctoritatem,

Cic. de Imp. Pomp. 15, 43:

bellum,

Cic. Off. 1, 11, 35; Caes. B. G. 3, 29, 2:

multa bona alicui,

Plaut. Poen. 5, 4, 46:

castra,

to pitch, Tac. H. 5, 1:

caulem,

to form, Col. Arb. 54:

clamores,

to make, raise, Cic. Brut. 95, 326:

cognomen alicui,

to give, Liv. 1, 3, 9:

commercium sermonis,

id. 5, 15, 5:

concitationes,

Caes. B. C. 3, 106 fin.:

conjurationes,

to form, id. B. G. 4, 30 fin.:

consuetudinem alicui cum altero,

Cic. Fam. 13, 23, 1:

consilia alicui,

Liv. 35, 42, 8:

contentionem cum aliquo,

Cic. Off. 1, 38, 137:

controversiam,

to occasion, id. Or. 34, 121:

convicium magnum alicui,

id. Fam. 10, 16, 1:

copiam pugnandi militibus,

Liv. 7, 13, 10:

corpus,

to grow fat, corpulent, Cels. 7, 3 fin.; Phaedr. 3, 7, 5:

curam,

Tac. A. 3, 52:

damnum,

to suffer, Cic. Brut. 33, 125:

detrimentum,

id. Verr. 2, 4, 9, § 20:

desiderium alicujus, rei alicui,

Liv. 3, 34, 7; 7, 24, 10:

dicta,

Ov. F. 2, 375; 3, 515:

difficultatem,

Quint. 10, 3, 10 and 16:

discordiam,

to cause, Tac. H. 3, 48:

discrimen,

Quint. 7, 2, 14; 11, 1, 43:

disjunctionem (with alienationem),

Cic. Lael. 21, 76:

dolorem alicui,

id. Att. 11, 8, 2:

dulcedinem,

Sen. Ep. 111:

eloquentiam alicui (ira),

Quint. 6, 2, 26:

epigramma,

to write, Cic. Arch. 10, 25:

errorem,

Sen. Ep. 67:

eruptiones ex oppido,

Caes. B. C. 2, 2, 5:

exemplum,

Quint. 5, 2, 2: exempla = edere or statuere, Plaut. Most. 5, 1, 66. exercitum, to raise, muster, Tac. A. 6, 33:

exspectationem,

Quint. 9, 2, 23:

facinus,

Plaut. Bacch. 4, 9, 1; Cic. Fin. 2, 29, 95; Tac. A. 12, 31:

facultatem recte judicandi alicui,

Cic. Verr. 2, 2, 73, § 179:

fallaciam,

Ter. And. 1, 8, 7:

famam ingenii,

Quint. 11, 2, 46:

fastidium,

Liv. 3, 1, 7:

favorem alicui,

id. 42, 14, 10; Quint. 4, 1, 33:

fidem alicui,

Cic. Cat. 3, 2, 4; id. Att. 7, 8, 1; Quint. 6, 2, 18:

finem,

Cic. Att. 16, 16, 16; id. Rep. 2, 44:

formidinem,

to excite, Tac. H. 3, 10:

fortunam magnam (with parare),

Liv. 24, 22, 9:

fraudem,

Plaut. Mil. 2, 2, 9; Cic. Att. 4, 12:

fugam fecerunt, stronger than fugerunt,

Liv. 8, 9, 12 Weissenb.; Sall. J. 53, 3;

but: cum fugam in regia fecisset (sc. ceterorum),

Liv. 1, 56, 4; so,

fugam facere = fugare,

id. 21, 5, 16; 21, 52, 10:

fugam hostium facere,

id. 22, 24, 8; 26, 4, 8 al.:

gestum vultu,

Quint. 11, 3, 71:

gradum,

Cic. de Or. 2, 61, 249; id. Verr. 2, 2, 1, § 3; Quint. 3, 6, 8:

gratiam alicujus rei,

Liv. 3, 56, 4; 8, 34, 3:

gratulationem alicui,

Cic. Fam. 11, 18, 3; Sen. Ep. 6:

gratum alicui,

Ter. Eun. 4, 4, 56; Cic. Rep. 1, 21; cf.:

gratissimum alicui,

id. Fam. 7, 21 fin.:

histrioniam,

Plaut. Am. prol. 152:

homicidium,

to commit, Quint. 5, 9, 9:

hospitium cum aliquo,

Cic. Balb. 18, 42:

imperata,

Caes. B. G. 2, 3, 3:

impetum in hostem,

Cic. Fin. 1, 10, 34; Liv. 25, 11, 2:

incursionem,

Liv. 3, 38, 3:

indicium,

Cic. Verr. 2, 1, 57, § 150:

inducias,

id. Phil. 8, 7, 20:

initium,

to begin, id. Agr. 2, 29, 79; cf.:

initia ab aliquo,

id. Rep. 1, 19:

injuriam,

id. ib. 3, 14 (opp. accipere); Caes. B. G. 1, 36, 4; Quint. 3, 6, 49; 10, 1, 115:

insidias alicui,

Cic. Mil. 9, 23:

iram,

Quint. 6, 1, 14:

jacturam,

Cic. Off. 3, 23, 89; id. Fin. 2, 24, 79; Caes. B. G. 7, 77, 7:

judicium,

Cic. Att. 7, 23, 2:

judicatum,

to execute, id. Fl. 20, 48:

jus alicui,

Liv. 32, 13, 6:

jussa,

Ov. F. 1, 379:

laetitiam,

Cic. Fin. 1, 7, 25:

largitiones,

id. Tusc. 3, 20, 48:

locum poetarum mendacio,

Curt. 3, 1, 4:

locum alicui rei,

Cels. 2, 14 fin.; 7, 4, 3; Curt. 4, 11, 8; Sen. Ep. 91, 13 et saep.:

longius,

Cic. Leg. 1, 7, 22 al.:

valde magnum,

id. Q. Fr. 1, 2, 2, § 7:

medicinam alicui,

to administer, id. Fam. 14, 7:

memoriam,

Quint. 11, 2, 4:

mentionem,

Cic. Q. Fr. 2, 11, 2:

metum,

to excite, Tac. A. 6, 36:

turbida lux metum insidiarum faciebat,

suggested, Liv. 10, 33, 5:

metum alicui,

id. 9, 41, 11:

missum aliquem,

Cic. Verr. 2, 3, 58, § 134:

modum irae,

Liv. 4, 50, 4:

moram,

Cic. Att. 16, 2, 1; Plaut. Most. 1, 1, 72:

morem alicujus rei sibi,

Liv. 35, 35, 13:

motus,

id. 28, 46, 8: multam alicui, Cato ap. Gell. 11, 1, 6:

munditias,

id. R. R. 2, 4:

mutationem,

Cic. Sest. 12, 27; id. Off. 1, 33, 120:

multa alicui,

id. Q. Fr. 3, 1, 5, § 16:

naufragium,

to suffer, id. Fam. 16, 9, 1:

negotium alicui,

to give to do, make trouble for, Quint. 5, 12, 13; Just. 21, 4, 4:

nomen alicui,

Liv. 8, 15, 8; cf.

nomina,

to incur debts, Cic. Off. 3, 14, 59:

odium vitae,

Plin. 20, 18, 76, § 199:

officium suum,

Ter. Phorm. 4, 5, 12:

omnia amici causa,

Cic. Lael. 10, 35; id. Fam. 5, 11, 2:

opinionem alicui,

id. Div. in Caecil. 14, 45:

orationem,

id. de Or. 1, 14, 63; id. Brut. 8, 30; id. Or. 51, 172:

otia alicui,

to grant, Verg. E. 1, 6:

pacem,

to conclude, Cic. Off. 3, 30, 109:

pecuniam ex aliqua re,

id. Verr. 2, 2, 6, § 17:

periculum,

Ter. Eun. 3, 2, 23; id. Heaut. 2, 1, 9; Tac. A. 13, 33; 16, 19; Sall. C. 33, 1: perniciem alicui, to cause, = parare, Tac. H. 2, 70:

planum,

Cic. Rosc. Am. 19, 54:

potestatem,

id. Cat. 3, 5, 11; id. Rep. 2, 28:

praedam,

Caes. B. G. 4, 34, 5; Cic. Verr. 2, 1, 60, § 156; Plaut. Poen. 3, 6, 8:

praedas ab aliquo,

Nep. Chabr. 2, 2:

proelium,

to join, Caes. B. G. 1, 13; Cic. Deiot. 5, 13; Liv. 25, 1, 5; Tac. H. 4, 79; id. A. 12, 40:

promissum,

Cic. Off. 3, 25, 95:

pudorem,

Liv. 3, 31, 3:

ratum,

id. 28, 39, 16:

rem,

Ter. Ad. 2, 2, 12:

reum,

to accuse, Cic. Verr. 2, 2, 38: risum, Cael. ap. Cic. Fam. 8, 9, 1; Quint. 6, 1, 40; 48:

scelus,

to commit, Tac. H. 1, 40:

securitatem alicui,

Liv. 36, 41, 1:

sermonem,

Cic. Verr. 2, 1, 26, § 66:

significationem ignibus,

Caes. B. G. 2, 33, 3:

silentium,

Liv. 24, 7, 12:

somnum,

to induce, Juv. 3, 282:

spem,

Cic. Att. 3, 16; Liv. 30, 3, 7:

spiritus,

id. 30, 11, 3:

stercus,

Col. 2, 15:

stipendia,

Sall. J. 63, 3; Liv. 3, 27, 1; 5, 7, 5:

stomachum alicui,

Cic. Att. 5, 11, 2; id. Fam. 1, 9, 10:

suavium alicui,

Plaut. As. 4, 1, 53:

suspicionem,

Cic. Fl. 33, 83:

taedium alicujus rei,

Liv. 4, 57, 11:

terrorem iis,

to inflict, id. 10, 25, 8:

timorem,

to excite, id. 6, 28, 8:

mihi timorem,

Cic. Fam. 10, 18, 2:

totum,

Dig. 28, 5, 35:

transitum alicui,

Liv. 26, 25, 3:

turbam,

Ter. Eun. 4, 1, 2:

urinam,

Col. 6, 19:

usum,

Quint. 10, 3, 28:

vadimonium,

Cic. Quint. 18, 57:

verbum, verba,

to speak, talk, id. Verr. 2, 4, 65, § 147:

verbum,

to invent, id. Fin. 3, 15, 51:

versus,

id. Q. Fr. 3, 5:

vestigium,

id. Rab. Post. 17, 47: viam [p. 717] sibi, Liv. 3, 5, 6:

vim alicui or in aliquem,

id. 38, 24, 4; 3, 5, 5:

vires,

to get, acquire, Quint. 10, 3, 3:

vitium,

Cic. Top. 3, 15 al. —

With ut, ne, quin, or the simple subj.:

faciam, ut ejus diei locique meique semper meminerit,

Plaut. Capt. 4, 2, 20:

facere ut remigret domum,

id. Pers. 4, 6, 3; id. Capt. 3, 4, 78; 4, 2, 77:

ea, quantum potui, feci, ut essent nota nostris,

Cic. Ac. 1, 2, 8:

facito, ut sciam,

id. Att. 2, 4, 4:

non potuisti ullo modo facere, ut mihi illam epistolam non mitteres,

id. ib. 11, 21, 1:

si facis ut patriae sit idoneus,

Juv. 14, 71:

ut nihil ad te dem litterarum facere non possum,

Cic. Ac. 8, 14, 1; for which, with quin:

facere non possum, quin ad te mittam,

I cannot forbear sending, id. ib. 12, 27, 2:

fecisti, ut ne cui maeror tuus calamitatem afferret,

id. Clu. 60, 168:

fac, ne quid aliud cures,

id. Fam. 16, 11, 1:

domi assitis, facite,

Ter. Eun. 3, 2, 53:

fac fidele sis fidelis,

Plaut. Capt. 2, 3, 79:

fac cupidus mei videndi sis,

Cic. Fam. 5, 21, 5:

fac cogites,

id. ib. 11, 3, 4.—In pass.:

fieri potest, ut recte quis sentiat, etc.,

Cic. Tusc. 1, 3, 6: potest fieri, ut iratus dixerit, etc., Crass. ap. Cic. de Or. 2, 70, 285:

nec fieri possit, ut non statim alienatio facienda sit,

id. Lael. 21, 76; so with ut non, id. Verr. 2, 2, 77, § 190 (Zumpt, Gram. § 539).—

With inf. = efficere, curare, to cause (rare):

nulla res magis talis oratores videri facit,

Cic. Brut. 38, 142; Pall. 6, 12:

aspectus arborum macrescere facit volucres inclusas,

Varr. R. R. 3, 5, 3; Sall. Fragm. ap. Sen. Ep. 114:

qui nati coram me cernere letum Fecisti,

Verg. A. 2, 539; Ov. H. 17, 174:

mel ter infervere facito,

Col. 12, 38, 5 (perh. also in Ov. H. 6, 100, instead of favet, v. Loers. ad h. l.; cf. infra, B. 4.).—

Absol.:

ego plus, quam feci, facere non possum,

Cic. Fam. 11, 14, 3:

faciam, ut potero, Laeli,

id. de Sen. 3, 7; cf. id. Rep. 1, 24:

noli putare, pigritia me facere, quod non mea manu scribam,

id. Att. 16, 15, 1; so,

facere = hoc or id facere,

Lucr. 4, 1112 (cf. Munro ad loc.); 1153: vereor ne a te rursus dissentiam. M. Non facies, Quinte, Cic. Leg. 3, 15, 33;

so after scribam,

id. Att. 16, 16, 15:

nominaverunt,

id. Rep. 2, 28, 50;

after disserere: tu mihi videris utrumque facturus,

id. ib. 2, 11, 22;

after fingere: ut facit apud Platonem Socrates,

id. ib.:

necesse erit uti epilogis, ut in Verrem Cicero fecit,

Quint. 6, 1, 54:

qui dicere ac facere doceat,

id. 2, 3, 11:

faciant equites,

Juv. 7, 14; Liv. 42, 37, 6:

petis ut libellos meos recognoscendos curem. Faciam,

Plin. Ep. 4, 26, 1; 5, 1, 4 et saep. (cf. the use of facio, as neutr., to resume or recall the meaning of another verb, v. II. E. infra; between that use and this no line can be drawn).

In partic.

With a double object, to make a thing into something, to render it something:

senatum bene firmum firmiorem vestra auctoritate fecistis,

Cic. Phil. 6, 7, 18:

te disertum,

id. ib. 2, 39 fin.:

iratum adversario judicem,

id. de Or. 1, 51, 220:

heredem filiam,

to appoint, constitute, id. Verr. 2, 1, 43, § 111:

aliquem regem,

Just. 9, 6:

aliquem ludos,

Plaut. Aul. 2, 2, 75:

aliquem absentem rei capitalis reum,

Cic. Verr. 2, 2, 38, § 93:

animum dubium,

id. de Imp. Pomp. 10, 27:

injurias irritas,

id. Verr. 2, 2, 26, § 63:

vectigalia sibi deteriora,

Caes. B. G. 1, 36, 4:

hi consules facti sunt,

Cic. de Sen. 5, 14:

disciplina doctior facta civitas,

id. Rep. 2, 19:

di ex hominibus facti,

id. ib. 2, 10; cf.:

tua virtute nobis Romanos ex amicis amicissimos fecisti,

Sall. J. 10, 2.—In pass.:

quo tibi sumere depositum clavum fierique tribuno?

to become a tribune, Hor. S. 1, 6, 25.—

to value, esteem, regard a person or thing in any manner (like the Engl. make, in the phrase to make much of).—Esp. with gen. pretii:

in quo perspicere posses, quanti te, quanti Pompeium, quem unum ex omnibus facio, ut debeo, plurimi, quanti Brutum facerem,

Cic. Fam. 3, 10, 2:

te quotidie pluris feci,

id. ib. 3, 4, 2:

voluptatem virtus minimi facit,

id. Fin. 2, 13, 42:

dolorem nihili facere,

to care nothing for, to despise, id. ib. 27, 88:

nihili facio scire,

Plaut. Pers. 2, 2, 42:

negat se magni facere, utrum, etc.,

Quint. 11, 1, 38:

parum id facio,

Sall. J. 85, 31: si illi aliter nos faciant quam aequum sit. Plaut. Stich. 1, 1, 43.—

With gen., to make a thing the property of a person, subject it to him: omnia, quae mulieris fuerunt, viri fiunt, Cic. Top. 4, 23.—Esp.: facere aliquid dicionis alicujus, to reduce to subjection under a person or power:

omnem oram Romanae dicionis fecit,

Liv. 21, 60, 3:

dicionis alienae facti,

id. 1, 25, 13; 5, 27, 14; cf.: ut munus imperii beneficii sui faceret, to make it ( seem) his own bounty, Just. 13, 4, 9:

ne delecto imperatore alio sui muneris rempublicam faceret,

Tac. A. 15, 52.—

To represent a thing in any manner, to feign, assert, say. —Constr. with acc. and adj. or part., or with acc. and inf.

Acc. and part.:

in eo libro, ubi se exeuntem e senatu et cum Pansa colloquentem facit,

id. Brut. 60, 218:

Xenophon facit... Socratem disputantem,

id. N. D. 1, 12, 31; cf.:

ejus (Socratis) oratio, qua facit eum Plato usum apud judices,

id. Tusc. 1, 40 fin. al.—

Acc. and inf.:

qui nuper fecit servo currenti in via decesse populum,

Ter. Heaut. prol. 31:

fecerat et fetam procubuisse lupam,

Verg. A. 8, 630; cf. Ov. M. 6, 109, v. Bach ad h. l.:

poetae impendere apud inferos saxum Tantalo faciunt,

Cic. Tusc. 4, 16, 35:

quem (Herculem) Homerus apud inferos conveniri facit ab Ulixe,

id. N. D. 3, 16, 41:

Plato construi a deo mundum facit,

id. ib. 1, 8, 19:

Plato Isocratem laudari fecit a Socrate,

id. Opt. Gen. 6, 17; id. Brut. 38, 142:

M. Cicero dicere facit C. Laelium,

Gell. 17, 5, 1:

caput esse faciunt ea, quae perspicua dicunt,

Cic. Fia. 4, 4, 8, v. Madv. ad h. l.—

In double construction:

Polyphemum Homerus cum ariete colloquentem facit ejusque laudare fortunas,

Cic. Tusc. 5, 39 fin. —

To make believe, to pretend:

facio me alias res agere,

Cic. Fam. 15, 18:

cum verbis se locupletem faceret,

id. Fl. 20:

me unum ex iis feci, qui, etc.,

id. Planc. 27, 65.—

Hypothetically in the imper. fac, suppose, assume:

fac, quaeso, qui ego sum, esse te,

Cic. Fam. 7, 23, 1; cf.:

fac potuisse,

id. Phil. 2, 3, 5:

fac animos non remanere post mortem,

id. Tusc. 1, 34, 82; 1, 29, 70:

fac velit,

Stat. Ach. 2, 241:

fac velle,

Verg. A. 4, 540.—

In mercant. lang., to practise, exercise, follow any trade or profession:

cum mercaturas facerent,

Cic. Verr. 2, 5, 28, § 72:

naviculariam,

id. ib. 2, 5, 18, §

46: argentariam,

id. ib. 2, 5, 49, § 155; id. Caecin. 4, 10:

topiariam,

id. Q. Fr. 3, 1, 2, § 5:

haruspicinam,

id. Fam. 6, 18, 1:

praeconium,

id. ib.; so,

piraticam,

id. Post. Red. in Sen. 5, 11:

medicinam,

Phaedr. 1, 14, 2.—

In relig. lang., like the Gr. rhezein, to perform or celebrate a religious rite; to offer sacrifice, make an offering, to sacrifice:

res illum divinas apud eos deos in suo sacrario quotidie facere vidisti,

Cic. Verr. 2, 4, 8, § 18:

sacra pro civibus,

id. Balb. 24, 55:

sacrificium publicum,

id. Brut. 14, 56.— Absol.:

a sacris patriis Junonis Sospitae, cui omnes consules facere necesse est, consulem avellere,

Cic. Mur. 41, 90.—With abl.:

cum faciam vitula pro frugibus,

Verg. E. 3, 77:

catulo,

Col. 2, 22, 4.— Pass. impers.:

cum pro populo fieret,

Cic. Att. 1, 13, 3:

quibus diis decemviri ex libris ut fieret, ediderunt,

Liv. 37, 3, 5.—

In gram., to make, form in inflecting:

cur aper apri et pater patris faciat?

Quint. 1, 6, 13; so id. 14; 15; 27; cf.:

sic genitivus Achilli et Ulixi fecit,

id. 1, 5, 63; 1, 6, 26:

eadem (littera) fecit ex duello bellum,

id. 1, 4, 15.—

In late Lat., (se) facere aliquo, to betake one's self to any place:

intra limen sese facit,

App. 5, p. 159, 25;

without se: homo meus coepit ad stelas facere,

Petr. 62:

ad illum ex Libya Hammon facit,

Tert. Pall. 3.—

Peculiar phrases.

Quid faciam (facias, fiet, etc.), with abl., dat., or (rare) with de, what is to be done with a person or thing? quid hoc homine facias? Cic. Sest. 13, 29; id. Verr. 2, 2, 16, § 40:

nescit quid faciat auro,

Plaut. Bacch. 2, 3, 100:

quid tu huic homini facias?

Cic. Caecin. 11, 30; cf.:

quid enim tibi faciam,

id. Att. 7, 3, 2: quid faceret huic conclusioni, i. e. how should he refute, etc., id. Ac. 2, 30, 96:

quid facias illi?

Hor. S. 1, 1, 63:

miserunt Delphos consultum quidnam facerent de rebus suis,

Nep. Them. 2: quid fecisti scipione? what have you done with the stick? or, what has become of it? Plaut. Cas. 5, 4, 6; cf. id. ib. 5, 4, 9.—In pass.:

quid Tulliola mea fiet?

Cic. Fam. 14, 4, 3:

quid illo fiet? quid me?

id. Att. 6, 1, 14:

quid fiet artibus?

id. Ac. 2, 33, 107:

quid mihi fiet?

Ov. A. A. 1, 536:

quid de illa fiet fidicina igitur?

Plaut. Ep. 1, 2, 48: de fratre quid fiet? Ter. Ad. 5, 9, 39.— Absol.:

quid faciat Philomela? fugam custodia claudit?

Ov. M. 6, 572:

quid facerem? neque servitio me exire licebat, etc.,

Verg. E. 1, 41 al. —

Fit, factum est aliquo or aliqua re, it happens to, becomes of a person or thing:

volo Erogitare, meo minore quid sit factum filio,

Plaut. Capt. 5, 1, 32:

nec quid deinde iis (elephantis) factum sit, auctores explicant,

Plin. 8, 6, 6, § 17:

quid eo est argento factum?

Plaut. Most. 3, 1, 106.—Hence,

Esp., si quid factum sit aliquo, if any thing should happen to one (i. q. si quid acciderit humanitus), euphemistically for if one should die:

si quid eo factum esset, in quo spem essetis habituri?

Cic. de Imp. Pomp. 20, 59; cf.:

eum fecisse aiunt, sibi quod faciendum fuit,

Plaut. Poen. 5, 1, 23. —

Ut fit, as it usually happens, as is commonly the case:

praesertim cum, ut fit, fortuito saepe aliquid concluse apteque dicerent,

Cic. Or. 53, 177:

queri, ut fit, incipiunt,

id. Verr. 2, 2, 23, § 56:

dum se uxor, ut fit, comparat,

id. Mil. 10, 28:

fecit statim, ut fit, fastidium copia,

Liv. 3, 1, 7.—

Fiat, an expression of assent, so be it! very good! fiat, geratur mos tibi, Plaut. Ps. 1, 5, 146; id. As. 1, 1, 27; id. Am. 2, 2, 138; id. Most. 4, 3, 44 al.—

Dictum ac factum, no sooner said than done, without delay, at once; v. dictum under dico, A. d.—

In certain phrases the ellipsis of facere is common, e. g. finem facere:

Quae cum dixisset, Cotta finem,

Cic. N. D. 3, 40, 94; id. Fin. 4, 1 init. —With nihil aliud quam, quid alium quam, nihil praeterquam, which often = an emphatic Engl. only (but not in Cic.):

Tissaphernes nihil aliud quam bellum comparavit,

Nep. Ages. 2:

per biduum nihil aliud quam steterunt parati,

Liv. 34, 46; Suet. Caes. 20; id. Aug. 83; Liv. 2, 63; 4, 3; 3, 26.—So with nihil amplius quam, nihil prius quam, nihil minus quam, Liv. 26, 20; 35, 11; Suet. Dom. 3.

With adverbs, to do, deal, or act in any manner:

recta et vera loquere, sed neque vere neque recte adhuc Fecisti umquam,

Plaut. Capt. 5, 2, 7;

v. recte under rego: bene fecit Silius, qui transegerit,

Cic. Att. 12, 24, 1:

seu recte seu perperam,

to do right or wrong, id. Quint. 8, 31:

Dalmatis di male faciant,

id. Fam. 5, 11 fin.:

facis amice,

in a friendly manner, id. Lael. 2, 9; cf.:

per malitiam,

maliciously, id. Rosc. Com. 7, 21:

humaniter,

id. Q. Fr. 2, 1, 1:

imperite,

id. Leg. 1, 1, 4:

tutius,

Quint. 5, 10, 68:

voluit facere contra huic aegre,

Ter. Eun. 4, 1, 10: bene facere, to profit, benefit (opp. male facere, to hurt, injure), Ter. Ad. 5, 8, 25; 5, 7, 19; Plaut. Most. 3, 2, 22; id. Capt. 5, 2, 23; v. also under benefacio and benefactum.—

Facere cum or ab aliquo, to take part with one, to side with one; and opp. contra (or adversus) aliquem, to take part against one:

si respondisset, idem sentire et secum facere Sullam,

Cic. Sull. 13, 36; cf.:

cum illo consulem facere,

id. Att. 6, 8, 2; and:

secum consules facere,

id. Planc. 35, 86:

auctoritatem sapientissimorum hominum facere nobiscum,

id. Caecin. 36, 104; cf.:

rem et sententiam interdicti mecum facere fatebatur,

id. ib. 28, 79:

cum veritas cum hoc faciat,

is on his side, id. Quint. 30, 91:

commune est, quod nihilo magis ab adversariis quam a nobis facit,

id. Inv. 1, 48, 90:

omnes damnatos, omnes ignominia affectos illac (a or cum Caesare) facere,

id. Att. 7, 3, 5:

quae res in civitate duae plurimum possunt, eae contra nos ambae faciunt in hoc tempore,

id. Quint. 1, 1:

neque minus eos cum quibus steterint quam adversus quos fecerint,

Nep. Eum. 8, 2:

cum aliquo non male facere,

to be on good terms with, Ov. Am. 3, 762.—

In late Lat. facere cum aliqua = vivere cum aliqua, to live in matrimony, to be married, Inscr. Orell. 4646. —

Ad aliquid, alicui, or absol., to be good or of use for any thing; to be useful, of service:

chamaeleon facit ad difficultatem urinae,

Plin. 22, 18, 21, § 46; Scrib. Comp. 122:

ad talem formam non facit iste locus,

Ov. H. 16, 190; cf. id. ib. 6, 128; id. Am. 1, 2, 16 al.:

radix coronopi coeliacis praeclare facit,

Plin. 22, 19, 22, § 48; so with dat., Plin. Val. 2, 1; Prop. 3 (4), 1, 20:

facit autem commode ea compositio, quam, etc.,

Col. 7, 5, 7; 8, 17, 13:

nec caelum, nec aquae faciunt, nec terra, nec aurae,

do not benefit me, Ov. Tr. 3, 8, 23:

mire facit in peroratione confessio,

Quint. 11, 3, 173; 171; cf. with a subject-clause: plurimum facit, totas diligenter [p. 718] nosse causas, id. 6, 4, 8: ad aliquid or alicui signifies also to suit, fit:

non faciet capiti dura corona meo,

Prop. 3, 1, 19; cf. Ov. H. 16, 189.—

Like the Gr. poiein or dran, and the Engl. to do, instead of another verb (also for esse and pati):

factum cupio (sc. id esse),

Plaut. Truc. 4, 4, 24:

factum volo,

id. Bacch. 3, 3, 91; id. Most. 3, 2, 104:

an Scythes Anacharsis potuit pro nihilo pecuniam ducere, nostrates philosophi facere non potuerunt?

Cic. Tusc. 5, 32, 90:

nihil his in locis nisi saxa et montes cogitabam: idque ut facerem, orationibus inducebar tuis,

id. Leg. 2, 1, 2; cf.:

Demosthenem, si illa pronuntiare voluisset, ornate splendideque facere potuisse,

id. Off. 1, 1 fin.; and:

cur Cassandra furens futura prospiciat, Priamus sapiens hoc idem facere nequeat?

id. Div. 1, 39, 85; so id. Ac. 2, 33, 107; id. Att. 1, 16, 13; Planc. ap. Cic. Fam. 10, 18, 2; Nep. Chabr. 3, 4; 4, 3 al.:

vadem te ad mortem tyranno dabis pro amico, ut Pythagoreus ille Siculo fecit tyranno (here also with the case of the preceding verb),

Cic. Fin. 2, 24 fin. (v. Madv. ad h. l. p. 278):

jubeas (eum) miserum esse, libenter quatenus id facit (i. e. miser est),

what he is doing, Hor. S. 1, 1, 64:

in hominibus solum existunt: nam bestiae simile quiddam faciunt (i. q. patiuntur or habent),

Cic. Tusc. 4, 14; so,

ne facias quod Ummidius quidam (= ne idem experiaris, ne idem tibi eveniat),

Hor. S. 1, 1, 94. —

Facere omitted, especially in short sentences expressing a judgment upon conduct, etc.:

at stulte, qui non modo non censuerit, etc.,

Cic. Off. 3, 27, 101.—Hence,

factus, a, um, P. a.

As adjective ante-class. and very rare:

factius nihilo facit, sc. id, i. e. nihilo magis effectum reddit,

is no nearer bringing it about, Plaut. Trin. 2, 3, 6; cf. Lorenz ad loc.—Far more freq.,

In the neutr. as subst.: factum, i ( gen. plur. factum, Enn. ap. Cic. Div. 1, 31, 66 Trag. 81), that which is done, a deed, act, exploit, achievement (syn.: res gestae, facinus).

In gen.:

depingere,

Ter. Phorm. 1, 5, 38:

facere factum,

Plaut. Truc. 2, 7, 5; id. Mil. 3, 1, 139:

dicta et facta,

Ter. Eun. 5, 4, 19; id. Heaut. 4, 5, 12:

opus facto est,

id. Phorm. 4, 5, 4:

ecquod hujus factum aut commissum non dicam audacius, sed, etc.,

Cic. Sull. 26, 72: meum factum probari abs te triumpho gaudio, Caes. ap. Cic. Att. 9, 16, A. 1;

14, 9, 2: quod umquam eorum in re publica forte factum exstitit?

id. ib. 8, 14, 2:

praeclarum atque divinum,

id. Phil. 2, 44, 114:

egregium,

id. Fam. 10, 16, 2; id. Cael. 10, 23:

factum per se improbabile,

Quint. 7, 4, 7; 6, 1, 22:

illustre,

Nep. Arist. 2, 2; cf.:

illustria et gloriosa,

Cic. Fin. 1, 11, 37:

forte,

id. Att. 8, 14, 2:

dira,

Ov. M. 6, 533:

nefanda,

id. H. 14, 16 al.; but also with the adv.:

recte ac turpiter factum,

Caes. B. G. 7, 80, 5; cf.:

multa huius (Timothei) sunt praeclare facta sed haec maxime illustria,

Nep. Timoth. 1, 2;

v. Zumpt, Gram. § 722, 2: dimidium facti, qui coepit, habet,

Hor. Ep. 1, 2, 40:

quo facto aut dicto adest opus,

Plaut. Am. 1, 1, 15 et saep.:

famam extendere factis,

Verg. A. 10, 468: non hominum video. non ego facta boum, doings, i. e. works, Ov. H. 10, 60.—

In partic., bonum factum, like the Gr. agathê tuchê, a good deed, i. e. well done, fortunate (ante-class. and post-Aug.):

bonum factum'st, edicta ut servetis mea,

Plaut. Poen. prol. 16; cf. id. ib. 44; cf.:

hoc factum est optimum, ut, etc.,

id. Ps. 1, 2, 52:

majorum bona facta,

Tac. A. 3, 40; cf. id. ib. 3, 65. —At the commencement of edicts, Suet. Caesar, 80; id. Vit. 14; Aur. Vict. Vir. Ill. 49, 17; Tert. Pudic. 1.—(But in the class. per. factum in this sense is a participle, and is construed with an adv.:

bene facta,

Sall. C. 8, 5; id. J. 85, 5; Cic. Tusc. 2, 26, 64:

recte, male facta,

id. Off. 2, 18, 62:

male facto exigua laus proponitur,

id. Leg. Agr. 2, 2, 5; id. Brut. 43, 322; Quint. 3, 7, 13; cf. Krebs, Antibarb. p. 460).—

facteon, a word jestingly formed by Cicero, after the analogy of the Greek, for faciendum: quare, ut opinor, philosophêteon, id quod tu facis, et istos consulatus non flocci facteon, Cic. Att. 1, 16, 13 Orell. N. cr. (for facteon, Ernesti has eateon).